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Setting Our Sights: The United States and
Canadian Investor Visa Programs
Robert C. Groven
The Immigration Act of 1990 (IM90) marked a significant
shift in U.S. immigration policy.' Prior to IM90, humanitarian
concerns largely drove U.S. immigration policy. With an eye to-
ward benefiting the American economy, IM90 refined and re-
oriented immigration admissions criteria. Where once America
sought only the world's tired and huddled masses, now the
United States has begun seeking the world's glittering masses-
the talented, famous and rich.
This historic break signaled an intention to use immigration
as a tool to generate economic advancement and help areas of
the country blighted by poverty and unemployment. One pro-
gram explicitly created for these purposes was the Investor Visa
(IV) program. 2 Under this program, applicants are required to
invest between $500,000 and $3,000,000 in the United States
and to create at least ten jobs.3 Prospective immigrants who
were not allowed to gain permanent residence through other
means, or who did not wish to queue up in extensive waiting
lists, could gain access through the IV program. This American
backdoor was loosely modeled after successful programs in Can-
ada and Australia. Unfortunately, the U.S. IV program, once
touted by promoters as one of the greatest jobs program in the
United States, 4 is now scorned as a "washout."5
1. THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID A. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS
AND POLICY 120-22 (1991).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A)-(C) (1990).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A), (C) (1990).
4. Suneel Ratan, For the Record, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1992, at A30 (quot-
ing immigration consultant, Paul Donnelly, describing the investor visa as "po-
tentially the biggest job-creation program in the country, and it won't cost
taxpayers a dime").
5. Suzanne Bilello, Visas Aren't Attracting Foreign Entrepreneurs, NEWS-
DAY, Apr. 19, 1994, at A39.
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Why has the U.S. IV program floundered, while the Cana-
dian program continues to draw large numbers of cash-laden im-
migrants? Congressional supporters charge that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was ineffective in
implementing the program. 6 The INS blames Congress for set-
ting unreasonable expectations and creating too many restric-
tions. 7 Many American business people and immigration
lawyers who promoted the program blame the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) policy of taxing U.S. residents on their worldwide
income.8 Others have broadened the list of mistakes to include:
the economy, the timing, alternative visa programs, 9 informa-
tion disclosure rules, active management rules, anti-fraud provi-
sions, 10 and more. This litany of errors has not been subject to
much careful review, however. Much of the suspicion has been
cast casually upon obvious targets.
To assess these speculations, this Note compares and con-
trasts the U.S. IV program to the Canadian program. Part I re-
counts the history, purpose and structure of the American and
Canadian IV programs. Part II questions the perception that
the American investor program is a failure, and analyzes possi-
ble flaws that have been suggested by the popular and scholarly
presses. Part III summarizes suggested reforms needed to im-
prove the U.S. IV program.
This Note concludes that the investor visa program set its
sights at crossed purposes. In essence, the program aimed in
one direction, fired in another, and missed the target. Those en-
trepreneurs most likely to use the program cannot meet its re-
quirements, and those passive investors able to meet the
requirements have little incentive to participate. This conclu-
6. Id. "Congressional officials say a fundamental mistake was letting INS
write the regulations for the program." Id. Jerry Tinker, staff director of the
Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, noted that "INS
doesn't have a clue about investments or job creation." Id.
7. Id. (quoting Edward H. Skerrett, an INS official, "Congress didn't want
a system that allowed passive investment because it was feared there would be
criticism that they were buying their way into the United States").
8. Michael S. Arnold, U.S. Visas for Rich Appear to be a Bust; Only 753
Millionaire Investors Have Applied in Nearly 2 Years, WASH. POST, July 26,
1993, at A6. "[The coup de grace was a U.S. law that taxes residents on their
worldwide earnings, not just the portion made in the United States. 'I have
many clients who would love to invest in the United States if they weren't sub-
ject to taxation on their worldwide income,'" a Washington immigration lawyer
said. Id.
9. Id.
10. Alex Beam, Millionaires Only, Please, BOSTON GLOBE, July 6, 1992, at
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sion suggests that the IV program can be improved either by
legislative fiat or regulatory tinkering. In either case, such
changes should parallel the Canadian program while preserving
the more flexible elements of the U.S. program.
I. HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF U.S. AND CANADIAN
INVESTOR VISA PROGRAMS
Although both the U.S. investor visa program and the Cana-
dian economic visa programs share many common ideas, they
are substantially different in history and form. This section ex-
amines the particulars of each program, compares the perform-
ance of the two programs and explains America's need for a new
immigration category specific to investors.
A. UNITED STATES INVESTOR VISA PROGRAM
Prior to passage of IM90, the United States unsuccessfully
attempted to launch an effective investor program. In 1988 and
1989, Senators Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Alan Simpson
(R-Wym.) spearheaded two bills similar to the current IV pro-
gram; both were defeated." Although previous immigration law
did contain a provision for economic visas, 12 it had little practi-
cal effect. These economic visas were only issued if surplus visas
remained unclaimed in other immigrant categories. 13 As a re-
sult of sustained demand in other visa categories, no economic
visas had been issued since 1977.14
1. History
The IM90 investor visa program was controversial from the
start. Congressional debate over the Kennedy-Simpson bill was
rancorous and long.15 Several last minute attempts were made
to defeat the IV program.' 6 Many contended that issuing inves-
tor visas was tantamount to selling the soul of the country for
11. S. 1611, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (the Kennedy-Donnelly Bill); S.
358, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (the Kennedy-Simpson Bill); Elizabeth A.
Thompson, Employment Creation Visas, in UNDERSTANDING THE IMMIGRATION
AcT OF 1990 105, 106 (Paul Wickham Schmidt ed., 1991).
12. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a)(7), 1101-1524 (1988).
13. Thompson, supra note 11, at 105.
14. Id.
15. Gary Endelman & Jeffrey Hardy, Uncle Sam Wants You: Foreign In-
vestment and the Immigration Act of 1990, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 671, 675-76
(1991).
16. Id. at 675.
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cash. 17 In the end, however, concerns over our national soul
yielded to the needs of the pocketbook. The hope that the IV
program would bring thousands of wealthy, job-creating entre-
preneurs to the United States ruled the day.' 8
Aside from concerns over morality, some critics charged
that the program would be a haven for drug lords hoping to root
themselves in the United States.' 9 Several anti-fraud provi-
sions were added to prevent this possibility. These provisions
imposed a two-year conditional residency period on recipients,
and greatly increased the amount of documentation required for
approval. 20
Some creators of the investor visa claimed it could generate
100,000 jobs and inject eight billion dollars of foreign capital into
the United States every year.2 ' Despite these great expecta-
tions, the U.S. IV program got off to a slow start. Fewer than
100 applications were received within the first year and a half.22
The INS did not finalize most of the relevant regulations until
late 1991.23 In fact, the proposed regulations governing the re-
moval of conditional residence status were not issued until Jan-
uary of 1994.24
These new regulations again raised the hope that the IV
program would attract business and create jobs. However, the
INS received only 1129 applications by September 30, 1994.25
17. Endelman & Hardy, supra note 15, at 675 (noting that "[ciriticism of
the investor provision centered primarily on a perceived 'cheapening' of the
value of American society and an assumed loss of economic sovereignty").
18. Id. "Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), a co-sponsor of the investor
provision in the Senate, emphasized that its main purpose was to create jobs.
Indeed, Senator Paul Simon (D-Ill.), an important advocate of the provision,
predicted that it would attract more than $8 billion in foreign investment in
U.S. business and create up to one hundred thousand new jobs for Americans."
Id.
19. Id. Senator Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.) "questioned the quality of immi-
grants our country would attract-in his opinion, mainly drug dealers." Id.
20. RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAw, 9-2 to 9-4 (Clark
Boardman Callaghan ed., 2d ed., Release # 2, July 1994).
21. Endelman & Hardy, supra note 15, at 675.
22. Ronald R. Rose, Fixing the Wheel: A Critical Analysis of the Immigrant
Investor Visa, 29 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 615, 615 (1992).
23. AusTrN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMEN-
TALS § 2.8(b) (3d ed. 1994).
24. STEEL, supra note 20, at 9-6 n.16.1; 59 Fed. Reg. 1317 et seq. (1994) (to
be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 216.6) (proposed Jan. 10, 1994).
25. Facsimile from Michael W. Straus, staff member, U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service Adjudications Division, Cumulative Investor
Figures as of 9-30-94, to Robert C. Groven, Minnesota Journal of Global Trade
2 (Nov. 15, 1994) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade) [herein-
after Cumulative Investor Figures]. As of March 31, 1994, the U.S. Immigration
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This figure is embarrassingly small when compared to the
10,000 visas per year Congress allotted to the program, or to the
9087 business visas Canada issued in 1993 alone, excluding
family and dependents. 26 Although the IV program is inching
forward, 27 the numbers have caused some immigration special-
ists to describe the program as "a resounding fiasco."28
When the U.S. program began in 1990, expectations for the
million-dollar visa were very high.29 Some promoters declared
the new program a "mini-gold mine,"30 whose possibilities were
nearly unlimited.31 This inflated vision of the program was
driven, in part, by American egotism.32 Accustomed to being the
premier destination of immigrants worldwide, the United States
assumed that the investor visa program would be flooded with
applications.33
The crucial difference between this visa program and all
others was the clientele. Investor immigrants are not the hud-
dled masses of American immigration history. They are
wealthy, sophisticated business people with many options. 34 As
a result of the freedom created by wealth and mobility, investor
immigrants are not clamoring at America's gates.35 Instead,
they assume the posture of cautious consumers.
and Naturalization Service had received only 983 applications for the so-called
millionaire visas, and 437 were approved. Bilello, supra note 5, at A39.
26. Bilello, supra note 5, at A39.
27. Arnold, supra note 8, at Al; Bilello, supra note 5, at A39 (illustrating
an approximate 100 visa increase from mid-1992 to early 1994).
28. Manfred Rosenow, 3 More Possible Ways To Get A Green Card, MIAMI
HERALD, June 29, 1992, at 16BM.
29. Paul Donnelly, Welcoming Hong Kong Immigrants: Changes in U.S.
Immigration Law Bode Well for Hong Kong Visa Recipients, 18 CHINA Bus.
REv., No. 2, at 10 (Mar./Apr. 1991). Some immigration officials predicted that
10,000 investor visas would be too few to meet the demand. Id.
30. Sam Fullwood III, Would-Be Advisers Bank on Visas for Foreign Mil-
lionaires, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1991, at 5A (quoting Jenifer Eisen, a policy assis-
tant with the American Immigration Lawyers Ass'n in Washington D.C.).
31. Ashley Dunn, $1-Million Visas Seeking to Lure the Wealthy to U.S. Im-
migration, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1991, at Al. Former commissioner of the West-
ern Region of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Harold Ezell,
stated that "the possibilities are totally unlimited." Id. Mr. Ezell currently
markets and sells investor visa packages to prospective immigrants. Id.
32. Arnold, supra note 8, at IA.
33. Id.
34. Charlotte Parsons, Money Talks in the Passport Chase, S. CHINA MORN-
ING POST, May 29, 1994, at 5.
35. Id. One immigration expert noted that "If you've got money you can go
anywhere .... You could buy your way into almost any country. Popular desti-
nations like Canada represent only a small proportion of the total numbers of
visas available to wealthy immigrants." Id.
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Despite the high expectations of many, some immigration
experts doubted the program would experience rapid success.
3 6
Some of these experts predicted that it would take five to ten
years for the U.S. program to catch up with the Canadian
program.37
2. Statistical Comparison of U.S. and Canadian Program
Performances
A comparison of Canadian and American IV statistics seems
to bear out the prediction of a slow, but accelerating start. Over
the first two years of the Canadian program the number of visas
rose by an average factor of 2.7.38 Over the first five years of the
program the number of visas rose by an average factor of 2.4.3
9
Table 1 shows that U.S. visas increased by a factor of 8.8 from
1992 to 1993. Even with a 1994 estimate of 783 visas, U.S. visas
increased by an average factor of 5.6 over the first two years of
the program. 40 This factor is well above the Canadian two year
average of 2.7, and noticeably higher than its five year average
of 2.4.
36. Susan Freinkel, 'Investor Visa' Program Spawns Legal Niche; Buying
into America, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1991, at 2. Howard (Sam) Myers III, then
AILA president, commented that "they never expected the program to take off
right away. Given the investment required ... it's only natural that inves-
tors-and their lawyers-are being cautious." Id.
37. Andrew Blake & John H. Kennedy, Such a Deal! Instant Entry Into
U.S. for $1 Million, Cm. TRuB., Sept. 7, 1991, at 1.
38. See EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, IMMIGRATION STATISTICS
50 (1991) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA].
39. See id.
40. Cumulative Investor Figures, supra note 25, at 2. The estimate of 783
visas by the end of 1994 is probably low. It is based on the 70% acceptance rate
evidenced by the number of approved applications. Assuming that 70% of the
383 applications that were unprocessed through September are accepted, then
268 of these unprocessed applications are likely to be approved. That creates
783 IVs likely to be issued by year's end. Note, these figures do not account for
the prospect that other applications may be filed between September and
January.
[Vol. 4:271
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Table 1. Investor Visas in Canada and the United States
Year U.S. Visas Change Canadian Visas Change
1 59 (1992) 316 (1987)
2 524 (1993) 8.8 1028 (1988) 3.2
3 783 (1994)* 1.52 2271 (1989) 2.2
4 n/a n/a 4208 (1990) 1.8
5 n/a n/a 5189 (1991) 1.2
6 n/a n/a 2295 (1992) -2.26
* Estimated; see infra note 41.
Sources: EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 50
(1991); I.N.S. STATISTICS DVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INS FACT
BOOK 13 (1994); Facsimile from Michael W. Straus, staff member,
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service Adjudications Division,
Cumulative Investor Figures as of 9-30-94, to Robert C. Groven,
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 2 (Nov. 15, 1994) (on file with the
Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
The result of this cursory analysis is ambiguous. 4 1 Based
strictly on annual average increases, the U.S. program appears
to be ahead of the Canadian program in its first few years. This
at least suggests the potential for the U.S. program to catch up
to the Canadian program. In absolute numbers, however, the
41. The difficulties with these statistical comparisons should be obvious
given the discussion in the text accompanying notes 38-43 and 54-92. First, the
numbers compare similar but not identical programs. The Canadian investor
program is the passive investment arm of the business visa program. The U.S.
investor visa program is an active investment program, although it has been
marketed and treated much like the Canadian investor program. Unfortu-
nately, examining the active Canadian entrepreneur program is not very use-
ful. The program has evolved slowly over the last 20 years and no clear starting
point for the present program exists. Even if such a starting point could be
found, it would be too far back in time to be useful. Between 1986 and 1990, the
Canadian entrepreneur program increased by only an average factor of 1.2.
That number, however, probably reflects the modest increases characteristic of
a mature program. Such numbers do not present a useful comparison to the
fledgling American investor program.
A second problem with these statistical comparisons is the extremely small
pool of data. Given that the U.S. program has only been active for three years,
it is hard to know if any reliable trend can be determined.
A third and final problem with these statistical comparisons is the many
cultural, economic, and political differences between the United States and
Canada. Canada possesses roughly one tenth the population of the United
States. The U.S. economy is substantially larger that that of its northern
neighbor. One might argue that the United States ought to have a much larger
investor visa program than Canada simply on the basis of scale. That argu-
ment may not be as persuasive as it first sounds. First, the numeric compari-
sons made earlier were all made in terms of increases, not in absolute numbers.
Second, the pool of wealthy investors is by nature small and selective. Unlike
most people, these investors are not tethered by financial constraints, and there
is therefore no reason to believe they must be evenly distributed across national
populations.
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U.S. program trails well behind the Canadian program. Fur-
ther, if one assumes the United States "should" receive a
number of investors that is proportional to its population, it is
far behind the Canadian program. Given the unique nature of
these visas and these immigrants, however, it seems prudent to
avoid assuming that the U.S. program "should" be categorically
different from the Canadian program. 42 Assuming that the
United States and Canada are on roughly equal footing in their
ability to attract these "yacht people,"43 the United States seems
to be off to a slow start. This slow start, however, does not yet
warrant sounding a death knell for the American program. The
perceived demise of the American investor visa program is prob-
ably exaggerated by cultural egotism and inflated expectations.
3. Alternative Immigration Routes
The investor visa program was structured to create new op-
portunities for foreign business people to gain permanent resi-
dence in the United States. Although several conventional
paths for alien business people already exist, the wait under
these programs is considerable. 44 If a business person wishes to
immigrate to the United States, but does not want to use the
conventional employment-based or family-based categories,
there are two other significant options.
The "L" non-immigrant visa allows corporations to transfer
executives and managers to the United States for up to seven
years, and specialists for up to five years. 45 Unlike most other
non-immigrant categories, the L-1 visa allows aliens to enter-
tain the intention of abandoning their home country.46 For this
reason the L-1 can be used to move an alien from temporary to
permanent residence. Investor immigrants, however, may be
confronted with a hurdle to using the L-1 in this way. The INS
has taken the position that self-employed aliens should not be
able to use the L-1 category.47 This restriction is aimed at
42. FREDA HAWKINS, CRITICAL YEARS IN IMMIGRATION: CANADA AND Aus-
TRALIA COMPARED 256 (1989).
43. Bilello, supra note 5, at A39.
44. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 227.
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L) (1990); 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)(D) (1990);
ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 236-38.
46. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L) (1990); ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 1,
at 237.
47. "The L classification was not created for self-employed persons to enter
the United States to consider self-employment, unless they are otherwise quali-
fied for L classification." 52 Fed. Reg. 5738, 5739 (Feb. 26, 1987).
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preventing what the INS views as the misuse of the L category
by investors and entrepreneurs. 48
The second major alternative route for an aspiring business
person is the E-2 non-immigrant treaty investor provision. This
provision allows an alien to petition for entrance without a spon-
soring organization if he or she comes solely to develop and di-
rect the operations of an enterprise involving a substantial
investment.49 The investment must not be in a marginal enter-
prise, and must therefore return significantly more income than
required to support the alien and the alien's family.50 So long as
the immigrant continues the investment activities for which the
E-2 visa was granted, the alien may remain in the United States
indefinitely.51 This status is therefore the next best thing to
true permanent residency. The E-2 visa is only available to
those nations who have a treaty with the United States or who
grant the U.S. reciprocal benefits.5 2
The limitations of these two programs and the waiting lists
for conventional immigration categories provided part of the mo-
tive for creating the investor visa program.5 3 The structure of
the program reflects this motivation.
4. Structure of U.S. Investor Visa Program
Section 203(5) of IM90 provides that 10,000 visas will be
made available each year for "qualified immigrants seeking to
enter the United States for the purpose of engaging in a new
commercial enterprise."5 4 A qualified immigrant must invest a
sum between $500,000 and $3,000,000 in the commercial enter-
prise and create at least ten jobs.55 The statutory language
breaks into six distinct requirements: (1) "qualified," (2) "engag-
48. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 245.
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E) (1990); ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 1,
at 240.
50. "An alien is classifiable as a nonimmigrant treaty investor (E-2) if...
the alien has invested or is actively in the process of investing a substantial
amount of capital in a bona fide enterprise in the United States, as distinct from
a relatively small amount of capital in a marginal enterprise solely for the pur-
pose of earning a living." 22 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(1) (1993).
51. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 238; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)
(1990).
52. ALEINIKOFF & MARTIN, supra note 1, at 238-39.
53. Elizabeth A. Thompson, Investment as a Basis for Permanent Immigra-
tion Benefits, 1994 MINNESOTA INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: IMMIGRATION
LAW sec. XII, at 1.
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A) (1990).
55. Id.; FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23, § 2.8(b).
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ing," (3) "new commercial enterprise," (4) "capital amount," (5)
"job creation," and (6) at-risk requirements implied by the "in-
vested or actively being invested" phrase. 56
To be considered "qualified," investor immigrants must be
eligible for immigration under all other INA provisions. 57 They
cannot, for example, be subject to exclusion for criminal or medi-
cal reasons. In addition, they cannot attempt to gain permanent
admission through any other visa program. 58
Investor immigrants must come to the United States for the
purpose of "engaging" in a new commercial enterprise. This pro-
vision has been interpreted to mean that investors must remain
active in the day-to-day management or policy formulation of
their investment. 59 Although no specific number of days in the
country is required, it is likely that a prolonged absence would
terminate the IV status. 60
The "new commercial enterprise" requirement does not lit-
erally mean that a new business must be created. There are
three ways prospective investors may meet this requirement.
First, they may simply create an entirely new and distinct busi-
ness. 61 The law does not require that any particular type of
business be created. Nevertheless, several types of businesses
are excluded, such as nonprofit corporations, investments that
only use independent contract labor, and renting one's own
dwelling.62 Second, an existing business may be expanded by
forty percent in terms of capital or jobs. 63 Third, a "troubled
business" with ten or more jobs may be preserved. A troubled
business is defined as one that has sustained a twenty percent
loss over the past two fiscal years. 64
The capital requirement moves on a sliding scale and is de-
termined by the U.S. Attorney General. An immigrant may be
allowed to invest a minimum of $500,000 if they do so in rural or
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5); FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23, § 2.8(b).
57. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23, § 2.8(b). (requiring that "[t]he peti-
tioner is an active, as opposed to passive, investor, and that he or she is or will
be engaged through the exercise of day-to-day managerial control or through
policy formulation").
58. Rose, supra note 22, at 627-29.
59. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (1992).
60. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23, § 2.8(c); Beam, supra note 10, at 13.
61. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(h)(1) (1992).
62. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e)(3) (1992) (definitions).
63. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(h)(3) (1992) (expansion provision); 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e)
(1992) (definitions).
64. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (1992) (troubled business definition).
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high-unemployment areas.65 An area's unemployment rate
must be 150% of the national rate to qualify.66 At the other ex-
treme, an immigrant may be required to invest a maximum of
$3,000,000 in a high-employment area. 67 The statute estab-
lishes $1,000,000 as the normal starting point for investments
in high-employment areas. For purposes of meeting these re-
quirements, capital is defined as "cash, equipment, inventory,
other tangible property, cash equivalents, and indebtedness se-
cured by assets owned by the alien entrepreneur, provided that
the alien entrepreneur is personally and primarily liable."68
The ten-job requirement has been called the "brass ring" of
the investor visa because it is one of the few unequivocal stan-
dards used by the INS in the program. 69 The jobs must be held
by American citizens or lawful aliens other than the immigrant's
spouse or dependents. 70 A job has been interpreted to be a full-
time job, and although work-share or work-flex agreements are
permissible, aggregating part-time jobs is not allowed. 71
Finally, the statute requires that the immigrant has al-
ready invested or is actively involved in investing the requisite
amount of capital. 72 This provision has become known as the
"at-risk" requirement. It is not sufficient for immigrants to pos-
sess a business plan, or even to have all of their financial plans
complete. They must actually be creating or running the busi-
ness itself.73 It is unclear whether this requirement means that
second-stage investments using secured third-party loans are
sufficiently at risk. If such loans guarantee a return, the capital
may not be considered at risk within the meaning of the stat-
ute.7 4 It is important to note that placing one's capital at risk
65. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(0)(2) (1992).
66. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (1992) (targeted employment area definition).
67. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(C)(iii) (1990).
68. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (1992).
69. Rose, supra note 22, at 627. "One of the advantages of the immigrant
investor visa is that it provides bright-line tests. Ten full-time employees is the
brass ring. Such certainty is not available using the labor certification exemp-
tion green card route." Id.
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A)(iii) (1990).
71. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (1992).
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)(A)(ii) (1990).
73. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(5); FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23, § 2.8(b). "The
petitioner must show that he or she has already placed the required amount of
capital at risk 'for the purpose of generating a return on that capital.'" Id.
74. Rose, supra note 22, at 629-34 (extensively discussing this issue and
the various tests currently used by American courts in determining whether
capital is at risk).
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does not ensure that a visa will be issued. The immigrant may
risk the money and still be denied a visa for other reasons. 75
In order for an IV application to be approved, immigrants
must provide extensive documentation. They must prove that
the required capital, earned through legal means, has been
placed at risk.76
If the immigrant application is approved, the applicant is
granted a two-year conditional permanent residency. 77 At the
end of two years, the immigrant must again petition the INS to
gain permanent status. This petition process also requires ex-
tensive document production. Among other things, conditional
residents must prove that their business is still viable, that their
ten workers are still working, and that they have a sincere in-
tent to continue the business. 78 If the business fails for any rea-
son during this two year period, the alien may lose the visa and
be deported. 79
B. CANADN BusiNEss VIsAS
Canada has operated a "business visa" program since 1978.
In 1986, the Canadian Ministry of Employment and Immigra-
tion revised the system and created a more flexible and inviting
visa program.80 In 1988, 4243 visas were issued under three
business categories. 8 ' Those visas brought with them hundreds
of millions of dollars and created many jobs. By 1990, the pro-
gram had "resulted in the direct creation and maintenance of
approximately 11,000 jobs." 2 In 1992, "nearly 7,000 investors
75. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23, § 2.8(b).
This provision may require an alien to put a substantial amount of his
or her capital irrevocably at risk in the United States without any
guarantee from the government that his or her immigrant visa petition
will be approved. As current law is now written, it does not appear
permissible for the alien to include an "escape clause" in the contract
establishing his or her participation in the new commercial enterprise
in the event the petition is not granted.
Id.
76. 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(1)-(5) (1992).
77. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)(B)(iii)-(d)(1)(C) (1990).
78. STEEL, supra note 20, at 9-8.1.
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)(B)(iii) (1990); FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23,
§ 2.8(c).
80. Ronald G. Atkey, Canadian Immigration Law and Policy: A Study in
Politics, Demographics and Economics, 16 CANADA-UNrrED STATES L. J. 59, 70
(1990).
81. Id. at 71. Of the 4243 issued, "3,081 were issued under the entrepre-
neur category, 840 under the self-employed category, and 322 under the inves-
tor category." Id.
82. Id.
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chose.., to go to Canada;" in 1993, the number of business visas
rose to 9087.83
The structure of the Canadian business visa is substantially
different from that of the U.S. investor visa. The system uses
three basic categories: entrepreneur, investor, and self-em-
ployed.8 4 These categories separate many of the requirements
that are combined in the U.S. program. Across all three catego-
ries, the entrance requirements are less burdensome, and the
program provides more options for passive investment.
The entrepreneur category requires: (1) an investment that
improves the Canadian economy and provides at least one job to
a legal Canadian resident; (2) the entrepreneur to remain active
in the day-to-day management of the business; (3) the entrepre-
neur to have successful past business experience; and (4) the en-
trepreneur to submit a business plan detailing the proposed
enterprise.8 5 It is important to note that in this category there
is no capital requirement. The at-risk requirements are also
low. The immigrant must have a plan, but no definite business
proposal is required at the time of application.8 6
The investor category requires: (1) a minimum capital in-
vestment between C$150,000 and C$500,000; (2) that the capi-
tal "contribute" to job creation for legal Canadian residents; (3)
that the immigrant have successful past business experience;
and (4) that the investment is locked into use for either three or
five years.8 7 In this category there is no concrete job require-
ment and no demand that the investor is active in management.
This category is designed to attract passive investors who are
not interested in doing hands-on work in a small business.88
Although this category does require that the capital be locked
into use for a period of years, the immigrant is allowed to in-
83. Arnold, supra note 8, at Al (7000 figure); Bilello, supra note 5, at A39
(9087 figure).
84. Atkey, supra note 80, at 71; 1994 IMMIGRATION AcT OF CANADA, §§ 6.11
(investors), 8.(4) (self-employed), 23.1 (entrepreneurs) (Frank N. Marrocco &
Henry M. Goslett eds., 1993) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION CANADA].
85. Asher I. Frankel, Canadian Immigration Law: Selected Topics and Re-
cent Changes, in 2 IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK (1991-92) 637,
645-46 (R. Patrick Murphy et al. eds., 1991); IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note
84, § 23.1.
86. Frankel, supra note 85, at 645-46.
87. Id. at 647; IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 84, § 6.11.
88. Frankel, supra note 85, at 648. "An immigrant need not demonstrate
active and on-going involvement in any business venture or activity, and can
therefore pursue any activity whatsoever, including passive investment." Id.
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clude a clause refunding the money if the government turns
down the business visa application.8 9
Under the investor category, the amount of capital required
depends on the investor's personal net worth and where the in-
vestment will be made. If an investor's net worth is at least
C$500,000, she or he may select a C$150,000 investment for
three years in an under-invested province, or C$250,000 for
three years in a more popular province. 90 In the alternative, an
investor may invest C$250,000 in an under-invested province for
five years, or C$350,000 for five years in a more popular prov-
ince.91 If the immigrant's net worth is at least C$700,000, he or
she must invest at least C$500,000 for five years. 92
The self-employment category requires the immigrant: (1)
to create or buy a business that will provide employment for
them, and (2) to make a significant contribution to the economic,
cultural, or artistic life of Canada.9 3 It is the most open-ended of
all the options. The chief concern with this category is that the
business be unique or in demand, and that it add to the cultural
life of the nation. Normally, artists and craftmakers with small
businesses use this category.94
Both the investor and entrepreneur categories use a two-
year conditional residency period. 95 There are no similar condi-
tions attached to the self-employment category. Once the visa is
approved, the immigrant becomes a permanent resident.9 6 This
sense of finality is attractive to many applicants.
89. Frankel, supra note 85. "The only limitation on the irrevocability of the
investment may be that the investment will be refunded to the investor if an
immigrant visa is not issued." Id. This supplies the comparable "escape clause"
missing from the U.S. program. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
90. Frankel, supra note 85 at 647; IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 84,
§ 2.(1) (definition of minimum investment).
91. Frankel, supra note 85, at 647-48; IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 84,
§ 2.(1).
92. Frankel, supra note 85, at 648; IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 84,
§ 2.(1).
93. Frankel, supra note 85, at 649; IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 84,
§ 2.(1) (definition of self-employed person).
94. Frankel, supra note 85, at 649. "The applicant, by definition, need not
establish a business that will provide employment opportunities but instead,
some personal quality (artistic, cultural) or benefit to the Canadian economy
.... Examples of what might be successful self-employed applicants are book-
binder, hunting and fishing guide, music teacher, etc." Id.
95. Lawrence C. Lee, Note, The "Immigrant Entrepreneur" Provision of the
Immigration Act of 1990: Is a Single Entrepreneur Category Sufficient?, 12 J.L.
& CoM. 147, 159-60 (1992); IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 84, §§ 6.11, 23.1.
96. Lee, supra note 95, at 159-60; IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 84,
§ 8.(4).
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Several changes to these programs have been proposed as
part of a comprehensive revision of Canada's immigration pol-
icy. Under the most current proposal, a C$100,000 minimum
requirement would be placed on the entrepreneur category; 97 a
uniform C$350,000 minimum for the investor category would be
set for all provinces;98 and the self-employment category would
be eliminated. 99 Although these proposals reflect Canada's
growing unease with a liberal immigration policy,' 00 they do not
undermine the thrust of this Note's argument.
II. COMPARISON OF U.S. AND CANADIAN INVESTOR
VISA PROGRAMS
A. SUGGESTED PROBLEM AREAS
Many theories attempt to explain the perceived failure of
the U.S. investor program. Most of these theories have not been
subjected to objective evaluation. The Canadian experience may
help assess the relative accuracy of the various theories concern-
ing the U.S. program.
1. U.S. Economic Recession
A number of commentators believed that weakness in the
American economy was partly to blame for the lackluster re-
sponse to the investor visa program. 1 1 Although this argument
is intuitively appealing,10 2 it is unlikely the recession played a
significant role in the IV program's troubles. At the time the
U.S. program was launched, Canada was experiencing one of its
most severe recessions since World War 11.103 In fact, many eco-
nomic observers noted that the U.S. and Canadian economies
seemed to be moving in tandem. 10 4 Although both economies
97. Tim Harper & David Vienneau, Clampdown on Immigration: Ottawa
Wants Newcomers Kept Off Welfare, ToRONTo STAR, Oct. 29, 1994, at Al.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Bonding with Immigrants, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Nov. 2, 1994, at A10.
101. Wendy Lin, Queens Immigration 'Millionaire Visas' are Going Begging,
NEWSDAY, July 7, 1991, at 12.
102. Id. One writer noted that "the rich like to get richer and the U.S. econ-
omy is in such a slump that the [investor visas] provision won't attract inves-
tors, even if the U.S. government throws in a green card-or residency
documents-as incentive." Id.
103. The Recession and Expected Recovery; Canada, OECD ECON.
SURVEYS-CANADA, Aug. 1991, at 11 [hereinafter OECD ECON. SURVEYS -
CANADA].
104. Douglas D. Peters, Canada: Recession and Recovery, Bus. ECON., Apr.
1991, at 51, 55.
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were moving toward recovery, Canada lingered behind the
United States in almost all sectors of the economy.' 05 From an
investor's standpoint, Canada was still in the grip of an eco-
nomic slump.' 0 6 If such economic dragons scared off investors,
one would expect Canada's investor numbers to decline precip-
itously. In fact, the numbers for investor and entrepreneur
visas declined only slightly, from 16,471 in 1990, to 15,090 in
1991.107 Although Canadian visa numbers picked up in 1992,
just as the American investor program began, only 59 American
investor visas were issued in that year.
The parallel performance of the American and Canadian
economies provides an excellent control to test the theory that
the U.S. recession can be blamed for the low number of IV's is-
sued in 1992. Both the U.S. and Canadian economies were
showing real recovery by the time the American IV program was
underway in 1991-92. An examination of these trends indicates
that economic performance had only a slight and short-lived ef-
fect on visa numbers.
2. Fear of Fraud
Many writers suggest that the fear of fraud played a sub-
stantial role in reducing the number of investor visa applica-
tions.' 08 Investors were supposedly afraid of scam artists who
would take the investor's money, and disappear without produc-
ing a green card. Although the fear of fraud probably played
some role in investors' decisions, there is no evidence of fraud
unique to the American program.
If the fear of being cheated out of their investments kept
investors away,' 0 9 such fear should have favored the American
program, not hindered it. Confidence in the American program
was seen as "a critical factor in the long-term success of the im-
105. Andrew Gurney & Ray Barrell, The World Economy, NAT'L INST. ECON.
REV. (UK) No. 137, Aug. 1991, at 24.
106. See OECD ECON. SURVEYS - CANADA, supra note 102, at 11 (comment-
ing that the recession in Canada hurt all aspects of the economy, but "has been
felt particularly strongly in Central Canada [and] has affected interest-sensi-
tive components of domestic demand especially strongly").
107. EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 38, at 50.
108. Dunn, supra note 31, at Al.
109. Ken Mayer, Foreign Affairs: Whether It Is Opening New Canadian
Businesses, Buying Existing Ones Or Wooing Canadian Investors to Do the
Same, Foreign Capital Is Fueling Business Activity, LONDON Bus. MONTHLY
MAG., Feb. 1992, at 6. One consultant noted that "Chinese immigrants are
leery of the immigrant investor program because many have been burned buy-
ing bad investment packages put together by less than scrupulous brokers." Id.
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migrant investor program." °10 Nevertheless, Canada's program
experienced a rash of frauds that "tainted" their program."1 '
Australia's program became so enmeshed in fraud, both against
investors and by investors, that it had to be shut down for a pe-
riod of time, and yet achieved successful levels of visa applica-
tions.112 Given this backdrop, it is difficult to believe that fear of
fraud in the virgin U.S. program would cause thousands of
frightened immigrants to invest in Canada and Australia
instead.
The resilience of fraud-tainted programs may be explained
by the business sophistication of the investors. As one expert on
Hong Kong investors noted, "You're not going to see much abuse
in the million-dollar category. . . these people aren't stupid."113
These immigrants are experienced and careful investors. Even
if investors are unable to detect fraud, they will hire someone
who can. 114 Although some scams undoubtedly succeed in de-
ceiving experienced investors and their lawyers, the experiences
of Canada and Australia demonstrate that fraud does not pose a
threat unique to the American investor program.
3. Timing of the U.S. Investor Program
The argument that the American IV program came too late
in the game is popular with many pundits.115 It is true that the
timing of the American program was unfortunate. Many na-
tions had long established their presence in the market by the
time the United States inaugurated its IV program, 1 6 making
the United States a "latecomer to the investor visa game."117
Some writers assert that this delay was a conclusive mistake,
permanently"18 depriving the United States of its share of the
market. 119
110. Rose, supra note 22, at 619.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 616 n.3.
113. Dunn, supra note 31, at Al.
114. See Arnold, supra note 8, at Al (An INS spokesperson commenting that
"[a]nyone who has a million [dollars] and wants to immigrate can probably get
himself a good immigration lawyer").
115. Tom Schmitz, Greenbacks for Green Cards: U.S. Has Begun Offering
Visas to Investors, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 5, 1991, at C13.
116. Parsons, supra note 34, at 5.
117. Schmitz, supra note 115, at C13.
118. Id.
119. Parsons, supra note 34, at 5. The delay, it is argued, caused a shift in
attitude so that "[bly the time the Government began handing out slices of the
American pie, Hong Kong's investors had developed an appetite for Canadian
passports." Id.
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Despite these dreary conclusions, other evidence indicates
interest in U.S. visas among potential investor immigrants. 120
The flow of investors to Canada does not necessarily mean that
interest in the United States is waning. One analyst noted that
"many [of his investors] have gone to Canada, but the country of
choice is the United States."121 Continuing interest by the for-
eign elite in the United States, and the ongoing success of the
Canadian program undermine the notion that timing was a fatal
error for the U.S. IV program. 122
4. Slow INS Regulatory Action
No one seems to doubt that the INS was slow to formulate
the regulations for the investor visa program. 123 Perhaps as a
result of the INS's lack of business expertise, the basic regula-
tions were not finished until November of 1991,124 while the fi-
nal regulations were only completed in January 1994.125 The
effect of the INS delay was reported to be considerable. 126 Many
investors waited for the final regulations before acting.127
Even after the INS issued most of the regulations, confusion
among potential investors further delayed applications. 1 28
When the regulations appeared, people were confused by the
120. Jon Basel, A Capital Idea; Attracting Foreign Investors in the U.S.,
SMALL Bus. REP., Mar. 1992, at 65; see also Lizette Alvarez, Million-Dollar
Visas; U.S. Offering Green Cards For Greenbacks to Stimulate Economy, GA-
ZETTE (MONTREAL), Sept. 26, 1991, at A13 (noting that investment promoters
anticipated increased interest by their clients).
121. Al Kamen, An Investment in American Citizenship Immigration Pro-
gram Invites Millionaires to Buy Their Way In, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1991, at
A21.
122. Basel, supra note 120, at 65.
123. George White, State Hopes to Attract Foreign Entrepreneurs, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 1990, at 2D (noting that the INS did not begin issuing visas
until October 1, 1991).
124. 26TH ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 461 (PLI Li-
tig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-486, 1993) [hereinafter
26TH IMMIGRATION INSTITUTE].
125. STEEL, supra note 20, at 9-6 n.16.1.
126. See Freinkel, supra note 36, at 2 (Howard S. (Sam) Myers HI, President
of the AILA, stating that potential immigrants "aren't willing to make that kind
of investment without knowing what the ground rules are").
127. See Dunn, supra note 31, at Al (noting that "most investors [were]
holding back until the release of final regulations, detailing the types of accept-
able investments").
128. See Schmitz, supra note 115, at C13 (indicating that because the pro-
gram was so new, people "did not know what to expect").
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complexity of the program. 129 Once the rules were understood,
some experts felt that U.S. investor visas were "both a compli-
cated and risky way of achieving a status which might more ef-
fectively be achieved by other more traditional immigration
strategies."130
Although this initial period was difficult and confusing for
investors and immigration experts, the program is now almost
entirely in place. 131 Whatever problems the sluggish INS re-
sponse may have created, the investor program is now beyond
them.
B. PERSISTENT PROBLEM AREAS
1. U.S. Worldwide Taxation
The U.S. policy of worldwide income taxation is the most
prominent reason given for the failure of the American investor
visa program.' 3 2 Worldwide taxation has been dubbed the "coup
de grace" responsible for bringing down the program. 133 A close
analysis of the issues, however, indicates that worldwide taxa-
tion should be only a marginal deterrent to potential investors.
The perception of a great difference between U.S. and Canadian
tax burdens is more threatening than the reality, for most
immigrants.
The United States uses a citizenship and residence-based
tax system. As a result, "a non-resident alien (NRA) individual
is taxed only on U.S. source income .... All other individuals,
including resident aliens, citizens, and U.S. nationals, are taxed
by the United States on worldwide income." 134 Unless some ex-
ception applies, even if a U.S. citizen is living in Togo, and earn-
129. See FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23, § 2.8(a) (noting that "because of
the complexity of the INS rules with regard to immigrant investors," few people
were likely to apply early in the program).
130. Howard S. (Sam) Myers II, U.S. Immigration Reform-A "Weather
Prediction," in FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAws AN D REGULATIONs at v, x (1993 ed.).
131. Rose, supra note 22, at 619.
132. Manfred Rosenow, Luring Millionaires to U.S. Proves Hard, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 30, 1991, at 12BM (suggesting that the tax problem is the "chief"
reason for IV failure). Of the more than 105 relevant articles surveyed, 57 men-
tioned U.S. taxes as a large problem to the success of the IV program, 48 criti-
cized the capital amount, 37 noted the restrictiveness of the investment options,
and 24 blamed the INS. See id. Many other causes also appeared, but these are
the most frequently mentioned, and the most heavily blamed. See id.
133. Arnold, supra note 8, at Al.
134. Roger H. Epstein, Tax Implications for the Foreign Investor, in Nzw
WAVES FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE 1990s 53 (Theresa Fisher & Alan W.C.
Ma eds., 1990); I.R.C. §§ 7701(b)(1)(A)(i), 7701(b)(3) (1988).
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ing all income in Guinea Bissau, he or she must pay taxes to the
United States on all income. 135
It is this worldwide citizenship tax that has earned the
United States an aggressive reputation.' 36 The perception that
U.S. taxes are more burdensome than Canadian taxes, whether
true or not, deters some investors from immigrating to
America. 13 7 Some critics, most of whom are working to save
their clients tax money,138 argue that "the high cost of taxes is
simply not outweighed by the benefits of living in the United
States."139
Some authors making this argument fail to make the cru-
cial distinction between taxes paid by citizens and taxes paid by
residents. 140 Authors who do not make this distinction incor-
rectly imply that other nations, including Canada, do not tax
their residents on all worldwide sources of income. In fact, "a
Canadian resident will be taxed on his income from all sources,
both within and outside Canada."141 A citizen who is a resident
in Canada must pay worldwide income taxes, while a citizen
who is resident abroad pays much less income tax to Canada. 142
So where is the real difference between U.S. and Canadian
taxes? Some have suggested that Canada makes it easier to
avoid "double taxation" (being taxed in two countries on the
same income).' 43 In fact, Canada and the United States have
very similar systems for avoiding double taxation. Canada al-
135. Rose, supra note 22, at 617.
136. See Donald K. Miller, Tax Considerations for U.S. Citizens Moving to
Canada, in TAX PLANNING FOR CANADA-U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
16:1 (Canadian Tax Foundation ed., 1994) (noting that "[the United States is
one of only a handful of countries that taxes its citizens wherever they are
resident").
137. See Rose, supra note 22, at 621-22 (noting that, in fact, many
"[pirofessionals involved with this program agree that the biggest problem with
the immigrant investor visa is the worldwide taxation [provision]").
138. Arnold, supra note 8, at Al.
139. Rosenow, supra note 132, at 12BM.
140. Id. For example, one author stated that "[t]he U.S. tax system con-
trasts with that of many European countries as well as Canada and Australia,
which give the foreign investor much more lenient treatment. In the end, the
cost of living permanently, and being taxed correspondingly, in the United
States may simply be prohibitive for the average investor." Id.
141. Bryan R. Emes, Planning for Immigration to Canada from Countries
Other Than the United States, in TAX PLANNING FOR CANADA-U.S. AND INTERNA-
TIONAL TRANSACTIONS 13:5 (Canadian Tax Foundation ed., 1994).
142. Id. at 13:2.
143. Richard Tremblay, Foreign Tax Credit Planning, in TAX PLANNING FOR
CANADA-U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 3:1 (Canadian Tax Foundation
ed., 1994).
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lows a series of limited tax credits and deductions to defray
double taxes. 144 The United States does the same. 145 Canada
has a broad network of tax treaties that can eliminate the prob-
lem of double taxation altogether.' 46 The United States has a
similar network of treaties. 147
The difference between the two nations might be explained
if Canada simply had lower tax rates and "softer" enforcement
policies. Canada actually has rather high tax rates, and rather
rigid enforcement, however.148
The critical distinction between the two nations rests in the
way the two nations define residence.' 49 Before examining this
distinction, an example may help illustrate the importance of
residence. A Hong Kong resident wishes to secure a new home
for her family. This investor has many sources of income around
the world, but none in the United States or Canada. She would
like to get an investor visa from the United States, live in Hong
Kong and pay no U.S. taxes on business outside of America. Un-
fortunately, she discovers that once she has a green card she is
automatically considered a U.S. tax resident and subject to
worldwide taxation. As a result, this prospective investor looks
to Canada. She has been told that only Canadian residents are
taxed worldwide, and that immigration status is irrelevant to
being dubbed a tax resident by Revenue Canada. The potential
investor believes she can have immigration residence in Canada
but not be a tax resident. In fact, it will be difficult and unlikely
that the investor can make this work.
The United States uses two tests to determine tax resi-
dency. Meeting either standard is conclusive. It is possible for
an alien to be a tax resident in the United States without in-
tending to reside permanently in America.15 0 The first tax resi-
144. Id.
145. 26TH IMMIGRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 124, at 134-35.
146. Tremblay, supra note 143, at 3:1.
147. See 26TH IMMIGRATION INSTITUTE, supra note 124, at 145 (listing the
relevant treaties).
148. Emes, supra note 141, at 13:1. One Canadian tax expert noted that
because "Canada imposes relatively high tax rates, defines income broadly,
taxes income on a worldwide basis, and enforces its tax laws strictly, the new
resident usually will face a greater potential tax burden in Canada than he did
in his former jurisdiction." Id.
149. For the remainder of this Note, the words "resident" or "permanent res-
ident" will refer to residency for immigration purposes such as determining citi-
zenship or deportation. "Tax resident" will, of course, refer to residency for tax
purposes, such as whether a person will be taxed on their worldwide income or
only their domestic income.
150. Epstein, supra note 134, at 53.
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dency test is referred to as the "green card test" and is met if an
alien is lawfully admitted for permanent residence under U.S.
immigration laws. 15 1 The second test is the "substantial pres-
ence test." It uses a mathematical formula to measure how
many days an individual has been in the United States over the
last three years. 152
The Canadian tax system also defines residence in two
ways. The first standard is objective and states that "an individ-
ual who 'sojourns' in Canada for periods of 183 days or more in a
calendar year is deemed to be [a tax] resident for the entire
year."153 The second standard is called the "concrete and sub-
stantial connection" approach, and examines many social and
business contacts to determine whether an individual is a tax
resident.' 54 Meeting either the subjective or objective test sub-
jects the individual to Canadian worldwide income taxation.
Canada has no green card test, and "[glenerally citizenship and
immigration status are irrelevant with respect to determining
[tax] residency." 155
At first blush, these rules appear to make it easy for a new
immigrant investor to avoid Canadian worldwide taxes. Unfor-
tunately for the investor, Canadian immigration law makes it
much harder for a new immigrant to avoid worldwide taxes than
for a citizen. Investors who enter Canada under the investor
visa program are eligible for citizenship after three years.156 In
the interim, immigrants must meet certain criteria or lose their
status as a permanent resident.
A person may lose permanent resident status under Cana-
dian law if they leave Canada with the intention of abandoning
Canada, or if they remain outside of Canada for more than 183
days.' 57 Now our fictional Hong Kong investor is in a bind. If
151. Id.; I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(A)(i) (1988).
152. Epstein, supra note 134, at 53; I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3) (1988).
153. Michael Cadesky, ADVANCED IMMIGRATION LAW: TAX CONSIDERATIONS
FOR THE IMMIGRANT 5 (Can. Bar Assoc. Ontario, CLE, June 18, 1990).
154. Emes, supra note 141, at 13:5. Some of the factors examined under the
concrete and substantial connection test "include such factors as the presence of
dependents remaining in Canada, ownership of Canadian property, housing
available on notice, Canadian bank accounts, professional or social member-
ships, a Canadian driver's license, the reasons for absence from Canada, and
the obtaining of a returning resident permit." Id.
155. Cadesky, supra note 153, at 3.
156. Emes, supra note 141, at 13:4-13:5.
157. Id. at 13:3. A permanent resident may lose their immigration status in
the following manner:
Section 24(1) of the Immigration Act provides that a person ceases to
be a permanent resident for immigration purposes when he leaves or
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she stays in Canada for 183 days, she can keep her permanent
resident status, but must pay worldwide taxes. If she stays out
of Canada for 183 days, she will not have to pay worldwide
taxes, but may lose her permanent residence status.
The last phrase of section 24(2) of the Canadian Immigra-
tion Act provides investors with a way out.' 5 8 That phrase al-
lows an immigrant to be out of Canada for more than 183 days if
the investor can convince immigration officials to issue a permit
stating that the immigrant did not intend to abandon residence
in Canada.' 5 9 To obtain a permit, however, an immigrant must
satisfy the same type of criteria used in Canada's subjective tax
residency analysis.' 60 As a result, convincing the immigration
officials that the investor did not abandon Canadian immigra-
tion residency will generally convince revenue officials that the
investor should be considered a tax resident.' 61
To become a citizen, the immigrant must "demonstrate ties
that... will lead to the conclusion that he was also resident in
Canada for that period for tax purposes." 62 Thus, if our Hong
Kong investor wants to become a Canadian citizen, as most per-
manent residents do, she will have to subject herself to world-
wide taxation for at least three years. The threat of losing
permanent residence, and the hope of becoming a citizen, com-
bine to force the immigrant to walk a very fine line if they wish
to avoid worldwide taxation. 63 For these reasons, the func-
remains outside Canada with the intention of abandoning Canada as
his place of permanent residence. In addition, section 24(2) of that
statute provides that permanent residents who have been outside Can-
ada for more than 183 days during any 12 month period are deemed to
have abandoned their permanent resident status, unless they have
satisfied the appropriate immigration authorities or adjudicator that
they did not intend to abandon Canada as a place of residence.
Id.
158. IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 84, § 24.(2), at 107.
159. Id.
160. Emes, supra note 141, at 13:3. In fact, "Revenue Canada takes the
view that 'where an individual enters Canada otherwise than as a sojourner [as
an immigrant], and establishes resident ties within Canada... he will gener-
ally be considered to have become a resident of Canada for tax purposes.'" Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 13:5.
163. See Cadesky, supra note 153, at 4 (commenting that with a talented
immigration lawyer at the immigrant's side it might be done. Normally, how-
ever, "an individual who intends to become a permanent resident of Canada for
immigration purposes will... become a resident for income tax purposes 'on
arrival.' ").
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tional difference between the tax status of an immigrant to the
United States and an immigrant to Canada is very slight.164
Although Canadian law currently allows immigrants to
keep their permanent residence status if they do not intend to
abandon Canada, a new amendment (§ 25.1) may eliminate that
option.165 That section changes the conditions under which im-
migrants lose their permanent residence. 166 If § 25.1 does be-
come effective, it is likely to eliminate the intent standard that
allows immigrants to retain their immigration status while be-
ing absent for more than 183 days. 167 It appears Canada may
be sealing up the crack that has allowed immigrants to keep per-
manent residence and avoid worldwide taxation. 168
If most investors desire to reside in their new land, unlike
our Hong Kong example, much of this analysis is irrelevant. For
many Asian investors, the decision to invest and to make a home
go hand-in-hand, 169 and that motive means investors are likely
to want to stay in Canada regardless of tax and immigration
laws. 170 In fact, the vast majority of Hong Kong investor immi-
grants stay in Canada even after they gain citizenship.' 7 ' If
Hong Kong investors are a representative example, most inves-
tors willingly remain Canadian residents and incur Canada's
worldwide tax burden even after they could leave. The fact that
164. Emes, supra note 141, at 13:3. Even when the steps taken upon arrival
do not create this conclusion, the "steps taken to preserve [permanent resi-
dence] will typically lead to living patterns that imply residence for tax pur-
poses." Id.
165. IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 84, § 25.1, at 112.
166. Id. This section eliminates the original intent language and substi-
tutes: "§ 25.1. A person ceases to be a permanent resident when (a) subject to
the regulations, the person ceases to ordinarily reside in Canada." Id. This
amendment was enacted in 1992 but was not scheduled to go into effect until
1994. Id. Nevertheless, the amendment only becomes effective at the discre-
tion of the Immigration Minister. Id. As of this writing the Minister had not
acted.
167. Emes, supra note 141, at 13:4.
168. Id.
169. Sandra Durrans, Love That Asian Money, B.C. Bus., July 1990, at 60.
Durrans emphasized that "the decision to come to [British Columbia] and locate
a business here is tied to the desire to live here. It is not an investment decision
alone." Id.
170. Id. Many Asian business people want to "invest where they live." Id.
171. See Moira Farrow, Hong Kong Exodus; Canadian Good Life Not Good
Enough For Many Wealthy Immigrants, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 7, 1995, at B8
(noting that local officials in Hong Kong estimate that, "[tihe return rate from
Canada usually after the immigrant has obtained Canadian citizenship is esti-
mated at about 15 per cent").
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investors maintain residence in Canada indicates they are will-
ing to endure worldwide taxation.
Despite this hopeful conclusion, the evidence indicates that
U.S. tax rules create a perceptual drag on the investor program.
It may be that investors make up their minds before examining
the tax laws of these two nations carefully. In any case, the
United States should either carve out a limited exemption for
investor immigrants, 172 or more effectively inform potential in-
vestors of the tax similarities between the United States and
Canada.
2. U.S. Capital Requirements
The American program requires substantially more initial
investment than the Canadian program. The celebrated million
dollar price tag has discouraged many investors. 173 In addition
to the sheer amount of capital necessary, the at-risk require-
ments cause many investors to seek safer investments in the in-
ternational visa market. 74
Many investors thought that the U.S. program was simply
overpriced.' 75 Some immigration attorneys argued that the
price tag was "the major fault" when "other countries are mak-
ing sweeter offers."' 76 After enactment, even the half-million
dollar exception was decried as too high an investment
hurdle.177
Some scholars note that requiring a large capital outlay
makes the program more likely to attract aloof millionaires than
hands-on entrepreneurs. 178 Ironically, the million dollar mark
may attract "foreigners who are able to meet the monetary
threshold but lack the entrepreneurial skills to run an American
commercial enterprise . . . [while] experienced entrepreneurs
172. Rose, supra note 22, at 615.
173. Arnold, supra note 8, at Al. "Congress and the INS apparently overes-
timated the value of U.S. citizenship to wealthy foreigners, many of whom can
already invest here under certain conditions, without resident status." Bilello,
supra note 5, at A39.
174. Rose, supra note 22, at 629-34.
175. Beam, supra note 10, at 13. One commentator noted that "[i]n the bid-
ding for transnational moneybags, we set the ante too high. Australia and Can-
ada, which have the most successful investor visa programs, ask that rich
people pony up as little as $250,000 .... " Id.
176. Ashley Dunn, Lure of Visas Fails to Attract Rich Investors, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 1991, at A3.
177. Arnold, supra note 8, at Al.
178. Lee, supra note 95, at 149.
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may be deterred . *..."179 Aside from attracting the wrong
crowd, or no crowd at all, the high price is unnecessary. Nothing
in the legislative history of the program indicates why the mil-
lion and half million dollar figures were chosen. The Canadian
program has succeeded in creating jobs and investment with a
much lower threshold.' s0 Moreover, "[als one former franchise
developer observed, a franchise employing ten full-time employ-
ees can be started for well under $1 million."181
Even if investors could afford to put up the money, they
might be leery of committing the money with no guarantee that
they will receive a visa. As noted above, the U.S. program re-
quires the investor to demonstrate that the funds for the invest-
ment actually have been committed before filing his or her
petition.18 2 This means that the investor must either already be
operating the business or close to actually starting opera-
tions.18 3 Evidence of intent to invest or plans to invest without
"present commitment" is not enough.' 8 4
Beyond the present commitment requirement, the investor
must place the capital "irrevocably" at risk.'8 5 Once the con-
tracts are signed, the investor cannot pull out of the invest-
ment.'8 6 If the application for an investor visa is denied, the
investor is saddled with the investment deal. In contrast, in the
Canadian program the "only limitation on the irrevocability of
the investment may be that the investment will be refunded to
the investor if an immigrant visa is not issued." 8 7 It is easy to
understand the attraction of an escape clause to a jittery inves-
tor who wants to live near her or his investment.
3. Few Investment Options
When Congress created the investor program it worried
that passive investments would be viewed unfavorably by the
public.' 18 Fear over the appearance of "catering to the rich"
caused Congress to emphasize the job-creation aspects of the
179. Id.
180. Beam, supra note 10, at 13.
181. Lee, supra note 95, at 162.
182. Id. at 156.
183. Id.
184. Rose, supra note 22, at 629-30.
185. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23, § 2.8(b).
186. Id.
187. Frankel, supra note 85, at 648.
188. Bilello, supra note 5, at A39.
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program.' 8 9 The INS may have read this mandate into the law
too strongly. In fact, IM90 "requires only that the immigrant
investors engage in a new commercial enterprise; it does not re-
quire that they engage in either direct management or policy-
making activities .... "190 The INS requires that the investor
remain active in the "day-to-day" affairs of the business or in
policy formulation. 191 Such management requirements may be
the only way to determine if the investor was responsible for cre-
ating ten jobs.
The INS left open the type of businesses that investors
could create. 192 INS believed that Congress did not intend to
needlessly regulate the type of business used for investment. 193
Even for-profit holding companies are specifically included
within the ambit of the investor program. 194 Despite this appar-
ent openness, the management requirements circumscribe the
types of investments actually available. 195 For example, "those
most likely to emigrate from Taiwan or Hong Kong made their
fortunes in real estate or import-export businesses" which are
not available in the U.S. program. 196 The result is a program at
odds with its most promising customers.
The large capital requirement tends to attract people more
accustomed to passive investment. People who "lack[ ] the busi-
ness acumen to successfully guide the enterprise in the long
run" are required to take charge. 197 To compensate, many of
these displaced investors gravitate toward service sector busi-
nesses that only provide minimum wage jobs. 198 Since they lack
the skill or desire to run the business for the long term, many
will probably sustain the business just long enough to receive
permanent residency. 199 For these reasons, the capital, man-
189. Id. An INS official commented that "Congress didn't want a system
that allowed passive investment because it was feared there would be criticism
that they were buying their way into the United States." Id.
190. Endelman & Hardy, supra note 15, at 674.
191. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23, § 2.8(b).
192. Lee, supra note 95, at 155.
193. Id.
194. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23, § 2.8(a). Nevertheless, "not-for-
profit corporations, charitable institutions" and utilities have been specifically
excluded from investment. Endelman & Hardy, supra note 15, at 674.
195. Lee, supra note 95, at 155-56.
196. John Tsui, The Money Immigrants, LODGING HosprrALrrY, Oct. 1991, at
26. Investment pools, commercial stock investment, real estate development,
and real estate speculation do not qualify as acceptable investments. Id.
197. Lee, supra note 95, at 161.
198. Id. at 163.
199. Id. at 161-62.
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agement, and at-risk requirements thwart the program's goals
of job creation and long-term economic growth.
In contrast, Canada offers many options for investors. Its
basic categories provide for both passive investors and active en-
trepreneurs. 20 0 Within the passive investment category, a Ca-
nadian investor may choose from a menu of options which is
more diverse and more flexible than its American counter-
part.20 1 Investors gravitate toward provinces with the most
flexible investment options.20 2 Those provinces that provide a
real return on the investment seem to fare best.20 3 To that end,
Quebec has used federal immigration laws to set up a province-
certified investment pool. 20 4 The local economy benefits from
this arrangement because the government makes the capital
pool available to small businesses at below market interest
rates.205
A visa is only part of an investor immigrant's ultimate goal.
For the business elite many nations offer both freedom and op-
portunity.206 These foreign investors insist on being treated bet-
ter than they would be treated at a bank.20 7 Their chief concern
is producing a solid and safe return on their investment. 208 An
immigration attorney noted that "realistically, any investment
from the Pacific Rim will be driven by the return on the financial
opportunity, not by the green card."20 9
This return-driven interest should cause U.S. immigration
officials to focus their efforts on creating a competitive prod-
200. Id. at 158-60.
201. Atkey, supra note 80, at 70-71.
202. Lee, supra note 95, at 159-60.
203. EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, supra note 38, at 8. Quebec is
the most popular destination for immigrant investors, and has one of the most
advanced investment arrangements. Joel Millman, Visas for Sale, FORBES,
Apr. 29, 1991, at 107.
204. Milman, supra note 203, at 107. "Why do investors like Quebec? Be-
cause the provincial government fully recognizes that while immigrants hope to
become Canadian citizens, investors also want to recoup their capital, with in-
terest if possible." Id.
205. Id. This capital pool "is managed by a government-approved securities
brokerage firm," and investors must meet eligibility standards before being al-
lowed to invest. Id.
206. See Parsons, supra note 34, at 5 (commenting upon the many options
available to wealthy investors).
207. Jane Applegate, Slow INS Response Thwarts Foreign Investment Pro-
gram, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1992, at F9.
208. Lin, supra note 101, at 12.
209. Schmitz, supra note 115, at C13.
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uct. 210 Unfortunately, given the restrictive U.S. system, some
investors have already turned elsewhere. 211
The U.S. investor program is not structured to meet its cus-
tomers' needs. This conclusion is supported by the Canadian ex-
perience. The passive investor program in Canada draws much
larger amounts of capital than the active entrepreneur pro-
gram.212 The entrepreneurs, on the other hand, create the lion's
share of direct employment. 21 3 These facts indicate that the
group of investors most interested in active day-to-day manage-
ment of a business are not the ones able to invest millions in
cash. Likewise, those who are willing to invest millions do not
choose to actively manage their investments.
Unlike the immigrants of legend, who yearn to be free, in-
vestor immigrants yearn to be richer. Because the American
program offers only restrictive investment options, both the type
of investors and the type of returns are rather limited.
III. PROPOSED REFORMS FOR THE UNITED STATES
INVESTOR VISA PROGRAM
The United States must decide what it wants in order to
realign the IV program's sights and take true aim at the target
of job creation and economic advancement. If the United States
wants to attract wealthy investors and large sums of capital, it
needs to change the perception of the U.S. tax code, restrict al-
ternative immigration routes, and expand the use of indirect job
creation. If the United States wants to attract entrepreneurs
who will build smaller businesses with their own hands, then it
should lower the capital amount, streamline the application pro-
cess, and loosen the at-risk requirements. If the United States
wants to attract both groups, it should consider bifurcating the
210. Jennifer Lin, Fare Trade: U.S. is Offering Green Cards to Lure $1 Mil-
lion Investments, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 23, 1991, at Al. The prospect of a green
card may be a powerful lure to foreign investors, but "[tihe first thing they [will
want] to know... after they get their green card in two years, [is] how could
they get their money back." Id.
211. Kamen, supra note 121, at Al.
212. EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, ANNUAL REPORT 38-39 (1990-
91). In 1990 Canada admitted 3024 entrepreneurs each of whom averaged a
C$143,000 business investment. In that same year, Canada admitted only 992
investors but each investor averaged "slightly more than C$2 million." Id.
213. Id. at 39. As of March 31, 1991, over 7683 jobs had been created by the
entrepreneur program, while the investor program created only about 2317 jobs
directly. Id.; EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, ANNUAL REPORT 19
(1991-92).
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program in order to create two types of investor visas with dis-
tinct requirements.
A. ExPAND INVESTMENT OPTIONS AND REDUCE AT-RISK
REQUIREMENTS
Investment flexibility is probably the area most in need of
reform. The combination of excessive capital requirements,
stringent at-risk standards, the bar against escape clauses, and
a rigid job requirement all conspire to make the U.S. IV program
an unattractive product. An examination of the Canadian pro-
gram suggests that allowing both passive and active investment
options should attract more immigrants.214 By attracting
slightly poorer entrepreneurs the United States may create
more and better jobs. 215
To attract both types of investors, the United States could
create two categories of investment options. 21 6 The passive in-
vestment option could be modeled after the Canadian immigrant
investor program, and could include large investment pools. 2 17
The second option would model the current U.S. active entrepre-
neur approach but lower or eliminate the minimum capital
requirement.
To facilitate the entrepreneur program, the definition of "ac-
tively in the process" of investing should be loosened, and the
program should provide investors with the option of inserting an
escape clause, in case the visa application is denied.218 Allowing
investments which are near completion may make investors
more willing to file for an investor visa.21 9 This could be done by
altering the evidence requirements to include proof of transac-
tions still in progress. 220
Loosening the at-risk rules so they comport more closely
with commercial business definitions of risk may encourage
more investment pools, and ease investors' fears of loss. 221 In
particular, capital investments which are exchanged for debt in-
struments such as bonds or notes should be allowed to bring the
program into line with current business practice. 222
214. Lee, supra note 95, at 159-60.
215. Id. at 162-63.
216. Id. at 163.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 197-213.
218. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 23, § 2.8(b).
219. Thompson, supra note 53, at 7-8.
220. Id.
221. Rose, supra note 22, at 630-32.
222. Thompson, supra note 53, at 8-9.
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Loosening the criteria for assessing job creation could en-
courage investment, and raise the quality of the jobs created. 223
By simply relaxing the criteria, the INS could improve the prob-
lem without changing the statutory ten-job requirement. A pilot
program currently running under the auspices of the INS dem-
onstrates how this might be accomplished. 224 The pilot sets
aside 300 visas each year for investors who demonstrate that
they have indirectly created ten jobs through improved produc-
tivity, economic growth, expanded export sales, and other crite-
ria.225 The petitioner bears the burden of producing a
reasonable methodology for the INS to use in evaluating the
job creation claim.226 Refining and expanding the pilot pro-
gram's approach could breathe new life into the investor visa
program.22 7
B. REDUCE CAPITAL REQUIREMENT
The Canadian experience suggests that hands-on entrepre-
neurs are not likely to possess enough cash to meet the U.S. cap-
ital requirements. 228 If the United States wishes to attract
smaller operations under the direct day-to-day control of the im-
migrant it should lower the capital requirement accordingly.
This could be done by simply decreasing the amount to
$100,000, in the entrepreneur category, and $250,000, in the in-
vestment category, the levels required under the proposed revi-
sion of Canada's immigration policy.229 Such action by Congress
seems unlikely, however, given the present anti-immigration
political climate.230
An alternate method for lowering the capital requirement is
available through the regulatory power of the INS. If the INS
changed the at-risk and investment standards to lower the debt-
to-equity ratio, entrepreneurs could meet the current $500,000
minimum more easily.231 Although such leveraging represents
some risk of instability, such practices are common in business,
223. See Lee, supra note 95, at 162-65 (suggesting that the present struc-
ture creates low wage, low skill jobs).
224. 59 Fed. Reg. 17,920-21 (1994) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.6(e) (defini-
tion of employee), 204.6(j)(4)(iii), 204.6(m)).
225. Thompson, supra note 53, at 23-24.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 24-25 (describing the flexibility of the pilot program).
228. See supra text accompanying notes 192-210.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
230. Bilello, supra note 5, at A39.
231. See Thompson, supra note 53, at 9-10 (explaining the AILA proposal for
loosening the debt requirements).
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and would fit the expectations of bankers and investors alike.23 2
The INS could also clarify its position on how capital reserves
are to be counted in the minimum requirement. 233 If the INS
were to inform investors about the ability to shield some of their
investment from risk by keeping it in reserve, the $500,000 min-
imum might appear more attractive.23 4
C. INFORM INVESTORS OF TAX POLICIES
The perceived burden of U.S. worldwide taxation certainly
is a deterrent to investors. 235 It is a deterrent despite the fact
that the actual distinction between the U.S. and Canadian tax
systems is surprisingly small.2 36 It seems unlikely that inves-
tors are making decisions based on these relatively minor dis-
tinctions. It is more likely that foreign investors are making
their decisions based upon a complex set of motivations, where
tax is only one consideration. To solve this problem, the United
States needs to better inform investors about these tax issues.
Although a limited tax exemption for immigrant investors would
be an excellent enticement, it may be both politically impossible
and unnecessary. 237
IV. CONCLUSION
The American investor visa program presents a puzzle that
becomes more complex as it unfolds. The Canadian story has
many lessons for the United States, but some of those lessons
are ambiguous. The popular press has declared the American
investor program a failure. The scope of that failure, however, is
difficult to determine. The most likely answer lies somewhere in
the middle and leads to the conclusion that the American pro-
gram is merely a slow starter. Even an optimistic assessment,
however, suggests that many aspects of the American program
should be changed to improve the program's lackluster
reception.
Several potential problem areas fade when examined
closely. Suggested areas such as the U.S. recession, fear of
fraud, and bad timing, are red herrings with little to distinguish
232. Id.
233. Lee, supra note 95, at 163.
234. Id.
235. See supra note 132 and text accompanying notes 132-35.
236. See supra part II.B.1.
237. See Rose, supra note 22, at 622 (commenting upon the political imprac-
ticality of carving out an immigrant investor tax exemption).
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them from problems that exist in the successful Canadian pro-
gram. Although slow INS promulgation of regulations may have
once played a part, this delay no longer threatens the investor
program's success.
Although the perceived burden of U.S. worldwide taxation
does deter investors, that perception is greater than the reality.
Under current laws, most immigrant investors will be forced to
pay worldwide taxes whether they live in the United States or
Canada. Even if investors were not compelled to remain resi-
dents and pay worldwide taxes, it appears that most immigrants
would accept that burden voluntarily.
Because foreign investors are neither huddled masses nor
yearning to be free they must be lured to the United States with
more than the promise of a green card. Allowing both passive
and active investment options should attract more immigrants.
A careful comparison of the U.S. and Canadian investor visa
programs reveals much about the American struggle to accept a
new immigration policy. America must learn how to entice the
world's wealthy while still embracing the world's poor. Like-
wise, America must learn how to use its immigration policy as a
tool to solve domestic economic problems without simply selling
visas to anyone who would buy. Such refined targeting requires
setting one's sights carefully. Unless the United States adapts
to this challenge, the nation of immigrants may fall behind in
the international race for opportunity.
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